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May 21, 1965.] .

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MATIAS
ROMERO PEREZ et aI., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Informer's Identity.-There is no privilege to refuse disclosure of an
informer's identity where disclosure is relevant and helpful
to the defense of an accused or essential to a fair determination of a cause.
[2] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Informer's
Identity.-When an informer is a material witness on the issue
of guilt and the accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination,
the People must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal.
[Sa, 3b] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Informer's Identity.-The refusal to require a prosecution witness to
disclose, on cross-examination, the identity of an informer
was prejudicial error where defendants ~laimed an unknown
person left marijuana in their room and, if the informer were
that person, he was the only one who might confirm defendants' testimony that they did not know their baggage contained
marijuana and his testimony might have disclosed entrapment.
[4] Id. - Privileged Oommunications - Disclosure of Informer's
Identity.-When defendants sought the identity of an informer, the court improperly refused to consider the affidavit
supporting a search warrant which would have shown that the
informer observed marijuana in defendants' room; defendants
showed cause to believe the informer was the stranger alleged
to have "planted" the marijuana, since one defendant remained
in the room most of the day in question and the only other
person known to have been in the room was the stranger.
[6] OriminalLaw-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.
-Inconsistent statements obtained from defendants while in
police custody cannot properly be admitted in evidence over
.objection where neither defendant was informed of his right
to counselor his right to remain silent.
[1] Accused's right to, and prosecution's .privilege against, disclosure of identity of informer, note, 76 A.L.R.2d 262. See also
Oal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 45.
McX. Dig. References: [1-4] Witnesses, § 60.5; [5, 9] Criminal
Law, §448; [6-8] Criminal Law, §107; [10] Criminal Law, §763;
[11-14] Criminal Law, § 50; [15] Searches and Seizures, § 42.
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[8] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel.-The rights to
sel and to remain silent attach when the criminal process
from investigatory to accusatory.
[7] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel.-When an accWtea'
is arrested and the authorities begin a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,.th,"
accused is entitled to counsel.
18] Id. - Rights of Accused - Aid of Oounsel. - To dete~~ ,
whether authorities are carrying out a process of interrogation to elicit incriminating statements (at which time the right
to counsel accrues), consideration must be given to the length
of the interrogation, its place and time, the nature of the. "
questions, the conduct of the police, and all other relevant
circumstances.
[9] ,Id. - Evidence - A drnjssions to Prosecuting Officers. - The
authorities carried out a process of interrogation to elicit '
incriminating statement which were thus inadmissible,
, ,absent advice to or waiver by defendants of their constitutional rights, where it was shown that after defendants were
arrested and taken to the police station, officers questioned,
defendants intermittently from midnight to 7 a.m., that the '"
questions were in accusatory form, and that defendants were
again questioned the next afternoon.
[10] Id.-Instructions--Defenses.-The trial court did not errone- '
ously refuse to instruct on entrapment where there was no
evidence that the man defendants alleged "planted" marijuana
in their room was a law enforcement officer or someone acting
in cooperation with the authorities.
[11] Id.-Defenses-Entra.pment.-Though the defense of entrapment is available to one otherwise guilty, it does not follow
that a defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense.
(Disapproving statements to the contrary in People v. Herrera,
232 Cal.App.2d 558, 559 [43 Cal.Rptr. 12]; People v. Herrera, 232 Cal.App.2d 561, 563 [43 Ca1.Rptr. 14]; People v ••. ',
Adams, 213 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [29 Cal.Rptr. 57]; PeopZe v.
Sherman, 211 Ca1.App.2d 419, 426 [27 Cal.Rptr. 353]; People
v. Benson, 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 532 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908]; PeopZe
v. Diaz, 206 Cnl.App.2d 651, 671 [24 Cal.Rptr. 367]; People v. '
Spencer, 193 Cnl.App.2d 13, 18 [13 Cal.Rptr. 881]; PeopZe
v. PolsaZski, 181 Ca1.App.2d 795, 801 [5 Cal.Rptr. 762]; PeopZe
[6] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq).
[11] Availability of defense of entrapment where accused denies
participating at all in offense, note, 61 A.L.R.2d 677. See also Cal.
Jur.2d. Criminal Law, § 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law (1st
ed §§ 335,336).
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v. Lollis, 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [2 Cal.Rptr. 420]; People v.
Jones, 176 Ca1.App.2d 743, 749 [1 Ca1.Rptr. 637]; People
v. Tillman, 142 Cal.App.2d 404, 407 [298 P.2d 631]; People v.
Cummings, 141 Cal.App.2d 193, 201 [296 P.2d 610]; People
v. Evans, 134 Cal.App.2d 733, 737 [286 P.2d 368]; People v.
Schwartz, 109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455-456 [240 P.2d 1024];
People v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 [222 P.2d 58];
People v. Gelardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [175 P.2d 855];
People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App.2d 690, 694 [121 P.2d 32];
People v. Lee, 9 Cal.App.2d 99,109 [48 P.2d 1003].)
[12] Id. - Defenses - Entrapment. - A defendant may properly
contend that the evidence shows unlawful police conduct
amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also shows
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[13] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Wben the evidence shows unlawful police conduct amounting to entrapment, the court has
a duty to root its effects out of the trial on its own initiative,
if necessary.
[14] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment is recognized as a
defense because the court refuses to enable officers of the law
to consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster
rather than to prevent and detect crime.
[15] Searches and Seizures-Remedies for Wrongful Search and
Seizure-Defenses.-Defendant may challenge the legality of
a search and seizure without admitting that the property
seized was taken from bim and without asserting a proprietary
interest in the premises entered.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Yolo
County. James C. McDermott, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. Judgments
of conviction reversed.
Joseph A. Martin, Public Defender, and John M. Beede,
Deputy Public Defender, for Defendants and Appellants.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M.
Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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TRA YNOR, C. J.-Defendants appeal from judgments of
conviction entered after a jury found them guilty of possession of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530.)
At 11 :30 p.m., October 13, 1963, State Narcotics Agent
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James Shirloh and Woodland Police Officer Glenn Barton en·!
tered a hotel room in Woodland pursuant to a search warrant
and conducted a search in the presence of defendants Perez and
Morales, who occupied the room. Agent Shirloh found a
canvas bag and a shopping bag in each of which was a package
of marijuana. He found in an ashtray a marijuana cigarette
that h.ad been partially smoked. The officers arrested defend- .
ants, took them to the police station, and interrogated them.
Morales made a statement inconsistent with two statements
made by Perez. Perez' statements were inconsistent with each
other and with his testimony.
Defendants testified that they came to Woodland on the
evening of October 12, 1963, to look for work. They met a man
at a tavern who drove them to a hotel. The man put a package
in Perez' canvas bag and carried it and his own shopping bag
into the hotel, where he paid for defendants' room. He put
the bags on the floor in defendants' room, placed $1.50 on the
dresser, and left. Neither defendant looked in the bags or
knew that they contained marijuana. 1 Neither of them knew
the name of the man, and Morales never saw him again ..
Perez testified that the man returned shortly after 7 :30 the
next evening, while Morales was out. He brought some tobacco
cans and cigarette paper, and he rolled and smoked a cigarette
that did not smell like an ordinary cigarette. He gave Perez
a package and asked him to bring it to him at 9 :30 p.m. at a
tavern on the ground floor of the hotel. When Perez did so
the man gave him $2.00. When Morales returned, Perez told
him that he was suspicious and that they had better leave the .
next day. At 11 :30 p.m., however, the officers conducted their
search and arrested defendants.
Agent Shirloh had obtained a search warrant on the basis
of his affidavit that he had received information from a
Teliable informer known to him who observed marijuana in
defendants' room on October 13th. Defendants sought to have
the affidavit admitted into evidence. Upon the prosecution's
objection, the court ruled that the affidavit was inadmi~sible.
During the cross-examination of Shirloh, the court also sustRined. on the ground of privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881,
811 hd. 5), the prosecution's objection to questions seeking the
l)ame of the informer. The court committed prejudicial error
in sustaining these objections.
] In response to Agent Shirloh's int.errogat.ion nt the police station,
however, Perez said that he and Morales "were in on the dEal and had
IIgreed to keep the marijuana for the man. "
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[1] "There is no privilege of nondisclosure [of an informer '8 identity] if disclosure 'is relevant and helpful to
the defense of the accused or essential to a fair determination
of a cause. . . . '" (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 807
[330 P.2d 33], quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.8. 53,
60-61 [77 8.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639].) [2] Thus, when the
informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the
accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the People
must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal. (Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d
639] ; People v. McSkann, 50 Ca1.2d 802, 808 [330 P.2d 33].)
In Roviaro v. United States, supra, a case that arose under
the federal narcotics law, disclosure of an informer's identity
was held to be required because the informer "had helped to
set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent
part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment.
. . . He was the only witness who might have testified to [the
defendant's] possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the
package [containing the narcotics] .... " (353 U.S. at p. 64.)
[Sa] Similarly, in the present case the informer was a
participant in the crime if it was he who left the marijuana in
defendants' room. (People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal2d. 748, 751 [3
Cal.Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673] ; People v. Williams, 51 Ca1.2d 355,
359-360 [333 P.2d 19]; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d.
694, 696 [316 P.2d. 1006].) His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment (People v. McShann, 50 Ca1.2d 802,
810 [330 P.2d 33] ; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 435,
451 [308 P.2d 821]), and he was the only person who might
have confirmed defendants' testimony that they did not know
that the bags in their possession contained marijuana.
[4] It is contended, however, that there is no evidence that
the man who left the marijuana in defendants' room was also
the informer. There is no merit in this contention. The court
improperly refused to consider the affidavit supporting the.
search warrant, which would have shown that the informer
observed marijuana in defendants' room on October 13th.
Perez remained in the room most of that day, and the only
person other than defendants known to have been in the room
before the officers entered was the stranger alleged to have
"planted" the marijuana. Defendants, therefore, showed
cause to believe that the stranger was the undisclosed informer. They seek the identity of the informer for the specific
purpose of determining if he is the stranger who might be
crucial to their defense. They need not prove conclusively

)
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before disclosure the very fact they seek to obtain through
disclosure. Such certainty of proof is not required as a fOWlda:tion for obtaining the identity of an informer who might be
helpful to the defense of the accused. (People v. Cas tiel, 153
Cal.App.2d 653, 659 [315 P.2d 79] ; see People v. Riser, 47
Cal.2d 566, 587-588 [305 P .2d 1].) [3b] The refusal to ,
require such disclosure was prejudicial error.
[5] If defendants are retried, the statements obtained
from them while in police custody cannot properly be admitted in evidence over objection, since neither defendant was
informed of his right to counselor of his right to remain
silent. (Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491 [84 S.Ct.
1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]; People v. Dorado, ante, pp. 338,
346-347 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].) [6] Those
rights attach when the criminal" process shifts from investigatory to accusatory." (Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. at
492; People v. Dorado, supra, ante, at pp. 348-349.)
[7] Thus, when the accused has been arrested and the au- ~
thorities begin a process of interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the accused is entitled to
counsel. (People v. Stewart, ante, pp. 571, 577 [43 Cal.
Rptr. 201,.400 P.2d 97].)
[8] In determining whether the authorities are carrying
l)ut such a process of interrogation, we must consider c, the
length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interrogation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police
and all other relevant circumstances." (People v. Stewa,.t,
Dln-te, pp. 571, 579 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].)
[9] In the present case, after Agent Shirloh and Officer
Barton arrested defendants and took them to the police station, they questioned defendants separately and together,
intermittently from midnight until 7 a.m., with the assistance
of an interpreter for the Spanish language. Shirloh put questions to both defendants in the form of accusations. He told
Perez, for example, that some money marked for identification
by the authorities had been found in his possession when he
was arrested, and then asked him to reconsider his answers in
light of such accusation. Shirloh testified that he repeatedly
showed Perez photographs of a man because he "wanted to
have on record . . . statements by him, pointed statements,
[that] he did not know this man." Both Perez and Morales
made statements during these predawn sessions. That afternoon, Shirloh, Barton, and a deputy district attorney took
turns questioning Perez and elicited another statement. It is

)
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thus clear that the authorities were carrying out a process of
interrogation to elicit incriminating statements and that the
statements obtained from both defendants are therefore inadmissible. (People v. Stewart, ante, pp. 571, 579 [43
Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].) Accordingly, we need not discuss Perez' contention that the statements made by him were
involuntary and for that reason inadmissible.
[10] There is no merit in defendants' contention that the
trial court erroneously refused to give an instruction on the
defense of entrapment. There was no evidence that the man
defendants allege "planted" the marijuana was a law enforcement officer or someone acting in cooperation with the
authorities. (Sherman v. Urvited States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-375
[78 8. Ct. 819,2 L.Ed.2d 848].) If such evidence is presented
upon retrial, however, an entrapment instruction would be
appropriate. We disagree with the Attorney General's contention that to invoke the defense of entrapment a defendant
must admit committing the criminal acts charged. [11] Although the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise
guilty (Peop'te v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [345 P.2d 928]), it
does not follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. A defendant, for example, may deny that he
committed every element of the crime charged, yet properly
allege that such acts as he did commit were induced by law
enforcement officers. (People v. West, 139 Cal.App.2d Supp.
923, 926 [293 P.2d 166]; Henderson v. United States (5th
Cir.) 237 F.2d 169, 173.) [12] Moreover, a defendant may
properly contend that the evidence shows unlawful police
conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it
also shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [13] When
the evidence does show such conduct, the court has a duty
to root its effects out of the trial upon its own initiative if
necessary. (See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453,
457 [53 8. Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86 A.L.R. 249] [Roberts, J.,
concurring].) [14] Entrapment is recognized as a defense
because "the court refuses to enable officers of the law to
consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster rather
than prevent and detect crime." (People v. Benford, 53 Ca1.2d
1, 9 [345 P.2d 928] ; see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445446 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].) A rule designed to
deter such unlawful conduct cannot properly be restricted by
compelling a defendant to incriminate himself as a condition
to invoking the rule. [15] Thus, the defendant may challenge the legality of a search and seizure without admitting

·~
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that the property seized was taken from him and without ~=!'1
serting a proprietary interest in the premises entered. (People ~.
v. Ibarr(J., 60 Ca1.2d 460, 465 [34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d i
487] ; People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 759-761 [290 P.2d 855].) .;>:
To compel a defendant to admit guilt as a- condition to invoking the defense of entrapment would compel him to relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt ibeyond a
reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his
burden of proving entrapment. To put the defendant in that
dilemma would frustrate the assertion of the defense itself
and would thus undermine its policy. (See People v. West, 139
Cal.App.2d Supp. 923, 926 {293 P.2d 166]; Henderson v.
United States (5th Cir.) 237 F.2d 169, 172-173; 1 Witkin,.
Cal. Crimes (1963) p. 169; 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333, 1343 j 70.
Harv.L.Rev. 1302; 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. 542.) Statements to the
contrary in the cases cited in the margin are disapproved. Z
The judgments are reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
I

McComb, J., and Schauer, J.,. concurred in the judgment. .)

---------------------JPllople .... Blln"6f'G, 132 Cal.App.2d 558, 559 [43 Oal.Rftr. 12];
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People .... BtJfT6f'a, 132 Cal.App.2d 561, 563 [43 Cal.Rptr. 14: ; PIIOP'"
v. Ada1n8, 213 Cal.App.2d 586, 540 [29 Cal.Rptr. 57]; Pllople v. Sherman,
211 Cal.App.ld 419, 426 [27 Cal.Rptr. 358]; Pllople v. B6MOfI" 206
Cal.App.2d 519, 582 [28 Cal.Rptr. 908]; Pllople v. ])W, 206 Cal.App.2d
651, 671 [24 Cal.Rptr. 367]; People v. Bpm.oer, 193 Cal.App.2d 13, 18
[13 Cal.Rptr. 881]; Peoplll v. Poual87ci, 181 Cal.App.2d 795, 801 [5
Cal.Rptr. 762]; People v. Lollis, 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [2 Cal.Rptr.
420]; People v. :Jones, 176 Cal.App.2d 743,749 [1 Cal.Rptr. 637]; People
v. Tillman, 142 Cal.App.2d 404,407 [298 P.2d 681]; People v. Cumming',
141 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [296 P.2d 610] ; PeopZe v. Evana, 184 Cal.App.2d
783, 787 [286 P.2d 368]; People v. SchwartB, 109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455456 [240 P.2d 1024]; Pllople v. :JohnaOfl, 99 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 [222
P.2d 58]; People v. GIIlardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [175 P.2d 855];
People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App. 690, 694 [121 P.2d 32]; Pllople v. Lee,
9 Cal.App.2d 99, 109 [48 P.2d 1008].
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assien• " ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

'.".

